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Introduction 
The European Competition Network (ECN) is the starting point for this paper but is 
used as a gateway for exploring larger questions about the development and impact of 
EU competition policy. The ECN came into operation in 2004 and serves as an 
enforcement network in respect of some, but not all, of the competition rules. It is a 
central element in the ‘Modernisation’ of EU competition policy brought about 
through Regulation 1/2003. Modernisation constitutes the most important transition in 
the fifty years of EU competition evolution and it affects the operation of the 
agencies, the priorities of the Commission and the effectiveness of enforcement. 
Further, it is argued here, the ECN clears the way for the development of a 
supranational redefinition of the philosophy or principles of competition policy itself. 
In the past I have argued that DG Comp has enjoyed such a unique degree of 
independence that it can be analysed as a supranational agency (Wilks with 
McGowan, 1995; 1996; Wilks with Bartle, 2002). In like fashion it is now possible to 
argue that the ECN can be analysed as a uniquely independent supranational network. 
There is no international regime or equivalent of the WTO for competition but we do 
now have a regional equivalent in the form of the ECN. Here we have something that 
comes very close to Slaughter’s (2004, p.42) vision of ‘executive transgovernmental 
networks’, especially if we can visualise the ECN as part of a trans-Atlantic, and 
possibly a global, network of competition regulators. 
  This paper therefore analyses the ECN on three dimensions.  First, on the 
administrative dimension, as a novel network configuration for enforcing competition 
policy in the EU.  Second, on the policy dimension, as the catalyst of an ongoing 
transition in the focus of European competition policy. Third, very briefly and more 
speculatively, on the constitutional dimension, as a means of embedding a particular 
economic doctrine in the ‘economic constitution’ of the EU. 
   2
The administrative dimension – the ECN and the enforcement of competition 
policy 
Analysis of the ECN, rather like analysis of DG Comp, falls into a no man’s land 
between theorising the position of non-majoritarian European agencies, and dealing 
with the majoritarian Commission. Thus, in a recent critique of EU agencies, 
Williams (2005, p.88) notes that ‘agencies should form nuclei for inter-national 
networks, in a way the Commission’s DGs (or their departments) simply cannot’.  But 
in fact this is exactly what DG Comp has done. The design of the ECN should 
therefore be seen in the context of the pre-existing power of DG Comp. Competition 
policy has famously been the Commission’s most powerful competence in which it 
applied EU law directly to European business and, in fact, also to European 
governments in respect of the control of state aid. There is no need for the frustrations 
of comitology and the Council is effectively excluded from this policy area except 
when pressed for new regulations in areas like mergers, state aid and utility 
liberalisation. This was a cherished area of supranational competence which meant 
that proposals for decentralisation through modernisation appeared positively 
revolutionary. The details of the modernisation package have been outlined 
thoroughly elsewhere (DG Comp, 2004; Wilks, 2005 a); b)).  Essentially they involve 
the Commission giving up the exclusive power to apply Articles 81 and 82 (TEU) 
which comprise the core prohibitions on restrictive practices and abuse of dominance. 
These powers can now be applied by National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and 
adjudicated by national courts; in fact the NCAs are obliged to employ EU rather than 
national law for any agreements that meet the test of effect on inter-state trade. At first 
glance this looks like a recipe for incoherence, divergence and fragmentation, which 
is the nightmare prospect that the ECN is designed to dispel. 
  The Commission’s decentralisation proposals were conceived at a time of 
increased interest in subsidiarity and enthusiasm for alternative modes of policy 
coordination, including European agencies and policy networks (Dehousse, 1997). 
The White Paper proposed ‘that the burden of enforcement can now be shared more 
equitably with national courts and authorities’ (CEC, 1999, p.5). It recognised, of 
course, the risk of incoherent and inconsistent enforcement but made only passing 
mention of ‘a network of authorities operating on common principles and in close 
collaboration’ (p.32). At this stage there remained substantial uncertainty as to 
whether Europe would see a fragmentation of policy making. The Network concept   3
was steadily refined in a process nicely captured in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (2004) 
and led eventually to the modernisation package and the key Commission Notice 
which formalised the Network (4/2004, see Ehlermann and Atanasiu, 2004, p.xvii). 
As the Network arrangements were finalised it became clear that the ECN was to 
become a very distinctive and disciplined network. 
  The ECN is primarily concerned with implementation rather than policy 
making. It is animated by legally defined cases working in a culture of European law 
and is very squarely centred on DG Comp. Unlike many other European policy 
networks it is not organised by Committees drawn from member states.  Competition 
policy enforcement does provide for Member State Advisory Committees and use of 
these committees was canvassed in the White Paper but rejected in favour of DG 
Comp ‘managing’ the Network directly. Jordan and Schout (2005, p.39) argue that 
network management is important but relatively unusual in the EU. DG Comp 
appears to provide an important example of this model of a managed network and, if 
the central role of DG Comp is accepted, then it implies that the ECN is centralised as 
well as supranational. So what does the ECN actually do? 
  The ECN undertakes a number of collaborative activities which resonate with 
themes in the network literature.  Its main functions are to share information and 
allocate cases under sections 81 and 82. The shared information is confidential and 
commercially sensitive which means that only formally designated national bodies are 
participants in the electronic pooling of information through the DG Comp website. 
This raises interesting points about the role of information in regulation (Majone, 
1997) but has raised anxiety in the world of competition lawyers (Reichelt, 2005). 
The allocation of cases is potentially highly controversial.  If any NCA opens a case 
against an undertaking it has to notify the Network within 30 days. Cases which 
involve more than three member states will be dealt with by DG Comp, otherwise 
handling of the case is subject to negotiation within the Network. A pattern has 
developed that the NCA opening the case typically continues to handle it and insiders 
are adamant that the anticipated disputes simply have not materialised and that the 
system operates far more smoothly than feared by critics such as Budzinski and 
Christiansen (2005). DG Comp possesses the ultimate power to step in and to take 
over prosecution of a case if the NCA concerned is acting slowly, incompetently or is 
becoming at variance with established EU legal or economic principles.  There was 
much initial concern that this would allow DG Comp to ‘cherry pick’ cases but up to   4
the end of 2006 the Commission had never employed that final sanction. In addition 
the Network allows for systematic collaboration in aiding investigation by other 
NCAs including a national NCA using its nationally based powers to undertake 
investigations and ‘dawn raids’ on behalf of other NCAs. Less formal exchanges also 
take the form of advice on the specifics of the case, on law or economics and it would 
be very interesting to track the ‘trade’ in advice, the British authorities, for instance, 
concede that they export far more advice than they import. Overall the ECN is a rather 
shadowy creature, there is relatively little transparency and relatively little comment 
on the operation of the Network.  There are plenary sessions, workshops and 
opportunities for the Network participants to meet (DG Comp, 2006, p.62) but so far 
its activities have been low key and have generated very little public comment. In 
short the pessimistic predictions put forward by quite a wide range of legal and 
academic observers have not been borne out by practice.  At least up to the present the 
ECN appears to be quietly successful. 
  What we see, then, is a very distinctive network of agencies.  It is exclusive, 
made up largely of national competition agencies with no non-governmental 
members; circulation of information is restricted to the network; there are tight rules 
of procedure; and the whole is managed by officials from DG Comp.  This is a very 
disciplined Network but it does remain nominally voluntary and has no formal legal 
authority. It is constituted merely by a Notice from the Commission which has been 
‘adopted’ by the member states.  The basis for the ECN is therefore soft law. It is 
worth emphasising that the vast majority of the Network participants are themselves 
national agencies (rather than ministries) which are independent within their own 
administrative systems.  In other words this is to a large extent a Network of non-
majoritarion or delegated agencies.  This has important implications to which we will 
return below. 
  Before proceeding to analyse the political implications of the ECN, and the 
possibility that it offers a model for other policy areas, it might be useful to locate the 
standing, effectiveness, and sheer variety of the agencies concerned. Table 1 sets the 
scene by setting out the ‘global elite’ of competition agencies.  The ranking relates to 
competence in enforcement and derives from the annual survey undertaken by a 
specialist journal, the Global Competition Review.  The survey shows eight globally 
admired competition agencies but of particular note is that the top ranking 
traditionally attached to the US agencies is now equalled by the EU DG Comp and by   5
the UK’s much more specialist Competition Commission.  This has implications for 
the US/EU cross fertilisation discussed later in this paper.  Table 2 details the full 
range of EU agencies. It shows the rankings and also gives information about 
resources. It includes data on the 12 EU agencies that are not ranked by the Global 
Competition Review because they are too new, small or inactive.  Table 2 illustrates 
the very substantial variation in resources and standing of the EU authorities and 
implies what many would concede, that whilst many agencies are highly effective, 
others are not.  Table 3 supplements this picture by providing data on activity within 
the ECN (note that of the agencies named only the UK Commission and the Spanish 
Tribunal are not formally designated members of the ECN). It indicates the number of 
cases opened over the first 32 months of the operation of the Network and illustrates 
some interesting variations in activism. The French and the Germans are predictably 
active but the British are not, with both the Dutch and the Danes opening almost as 
many cases as the British. More particularly, the figures show a very marked actual 
decentralisation of implementation with only 20% of cases being handled by DG 
Comp.  
On a somewhat impressionistic ranking we could identify four ‘leagues’ of 
effectiveness and activism within the ECN: 
      No.   % cases opened
- Elite:   EU, Fr, Ge, UK, (It)        5      53 
- Good   Den, Fin, Ire, Neth        4      19 
- Problematic  Sp, Swe, Port, Aust, Pol      5      17 
- Ineffectual  Gr, Belg, Lux + 11 new MS    14      11 
 
The league table indicated that the ‘elite’ (in which Italy is included due to its size and 
improving standing) and the ‘good’ NCAs handle nearly three quarters of all cases. 
But all the authorities are active and even the ‘Ineffectual’ category has opened 11% 
of the cases with the Hungarians being particularly energetic. 
 
The network politics of the ECN 
The ECN is a variant of the European Regulatory Networks (ERNs) analysed by Coen 
and Thatcher (2006). They take a principal-agent approach and are rather sceptical of 
claims that ERNs may exploit a degree of independence and become a 
transgovernmental source of policy making.  In particular they note the continued   6
domination of the Commission in controlling their goals and operation. While noting 
the reservations explored by Coen and Thatcher this paper takes slightly different 
approach.  It is more constructivist in emphasising the normative understandings 
which appear to animate the Network and it analyses the possibility that the 
Commission could become more open to innovations originating with other well 
resourced agencies within the Network. 
  The politics of the ERN offer room for quite variant interpretations. An 
important question concerns the balance of influence within the Network between the 
Commission and the 27 NCAs. My argument has been that, despite an early rhetoric 
of decentralisation, DG Comp has created a system within which it is almost 
completely dominant (Wilks, 2005a).  Other analysts such as Kassim (2007) are 
sceptical of this thesis of centralisation although it is not quite clear whether they 
challenge the argument that the Commission has established centralised control over 
the Network, or whether they accept the thesis of centralisation but believe that it 
happened with the active support of the member states. A diagnosis of Commission 
dominance would therefore suggest that the ECN is a ‘steered’ Network, or even a 
‘directed’ Network or, to enter oxymoron territory, a ‘hierarchical Network’. To use a 
looser analogy, Marc van de Woude (2003) has referred to the Commission as ‘the 
headmaster’ and its ability to remove NCAs from cases as ‘the headmaster’s stick’. 
  It is, however, possible to suggest that the dominance of DG Comp might be 
unstable. The Network is populated with some extremely impressive agencies, well 
resourced with money, staff and the intellectual firepower of very able economists 
and lawyers. Table 2 indicates that DG Comp commands a budget of E90 mn. and 
382 staff against a combined budget of the three NCAs of France, Germany and the 
UK of E132 mn. and 931 staff. In economics expertise alone DG Comp has 134 
economists, 13 of whom hold PhDs. In contrast the three leading NCAs have 286 
economists with 46 PhDs (the US agencies have 121 economists all of whom hold 
PhDs) (GCR, 2005).  DG Comp looks seriously outgunned. It is hardly likely that the 
leading European agencies will be wholly in agreement with advice and initiatives 
emerging from Brussels and they may be influenced by the distinctive industrial 
politics and industrial organisation of their respective countries. It might further be 
imagined that the national agencies will be resentful of the way in which the 
Modernisation regulation has displaced or marginalised the operation of national law.  
The BKA in particular has fought hard to defend the German cartel laws against the   7
override from Brussels (Quack and Djelic, 2005).  On this basis one might have 
expected disagreements and tensions to have developed within and around the ECN 
and possibly the development of coalitions lobbying for change in the design or 
enforcement of policy.  Indeed, many early critics of the modernisation reforms 
anticipated a ‘renationalisation’ of competition law. Yet such tensions have not 
emerged and the ECN, along with the other dimensions of EU competition 
enforcement appear successful and coherent.  How is one to account for this striking 
success? 
  Before offering an explanation one caveat is that it is still early days and 
turmoil within the ECN may yet emerge. It is widely accepted that there are problems 
with the operation of the ECN, especially in respect of the crucially important 
leniency programmes, where the diverse legal arrangements across the Union make 
filings and negotiation highly uncertain; and in respect of criminal actions which are 
possible in a minority of countries and which create problems in using shared 
information. But these are essentially technical issues and no strong unease has as yet 
been expressed by Network members. 
  The two possible explanations for the success of the ECN advanced here are 
sectoral agency solidarity and the common competition culture.  As regards sectoral 
agency solidarity, almost without exception the NCAs are depoliticised agencies with 
delegated powers who are fiercely jealous if their independence (Wilks, 2002). Their 
legal foundations, their self-esteem and their operational credibility all rely upon 
maintaining independence from politicians, government ministries and powerful 
indigenous business interests. In this setting external support from sister agencies and 
from DG Comp is a powerful weapon of defence. In a characteristically perceptive 
anticipation of this solidarity Majone suggested ‘the network as a bearer of reputation’ 
arguing that: 
an agency that sees itself as part of a transnational network of institutions 
  pursuing similar objectives and facing analogous problems, rather than as a 
  marginal addition to an established bureaucracy pursuing a variety of 
  objectives, is more motivated to defend policy commitments and/or 
  professional standards against external influences (Majone, 1997, p.272).  
This sense of solidarity can stretch almost into a social community, Dieter Wolf, 
when Head of the BKA, liked to refer to the European agencies as members of ‘the 
cartel family’ and, whilst the Germans might not need to invoke the influence of   8
Brussels and the ECN, it is likely that this source of support is very important in 
internal bureaucratic negotiations, especially in the new accession countries such as 
Hungary. The solidarity argument thus draws on the familiar idea that experts or 
professionals (who largely dominate the competition agencies) will look for esteem 
and peer appreciation to fellow professionals in the community as much as to their 
home administrations.  We can thus envisage NCAs as located in a matrix which 
involves vertical responsibilities up to national politicians and down to national 
stakeholders; but also horizontally ‘across’ to DG Comp and to collaborating agencies 
in the Network. This can be expressed in P-A terms as a ‘double delegation’ in that 
the agencies have two principals (Coen and Thatcher, 2006). The interesting 
implication is how these competing loyalties will play out when national policy 
preferences collide with pan-European Network priorities, as has happened recently in 
merger control through the confrontation over protection of so-called ‘national 
champions’ in Poland and Spain (for instance, the resistance to the takeover of the 
Spanish energy company Endesa by the German Eon in Autumn 2006). 
  The second explanation for the smooth running of the ECN is more explicitly 
normative and lies in the idea of a ‘common competition culture’ across Europe.  
Time and again the Commission has advanced this proposition both as a justification 
for Modernisation, arguing that the member states are now mature enough to be 
trusted to defend competition; and as a basis for pan-European coherence and 
convergence of enforcement. It would be possible to argue that the smooth operation 
of the ECN is dependent on the shared common competition culture which DG Comp 
is self-consciously nurturing.  Kris Dekeyser, the well-respected Commission official 
who has had the responsibility of managing the Network since its inception, has noted 
that: 
we have a whole area of less formal cooperation within the ECN which is also 
  very important because it pursues the objective of promoting a common 
  competition culture. …. The ECN has proven to be a very good tool in this 
  respect. It is really a broadly functioning framework for discussing all issues 
  of mutual concern and for agreeing on a common approach which is, indeed, 
  needed to foster the common competition enforcement culture and promote 
  convergence (Dekeyser, 2005, p.3). 
This concept of the ‘common competition culture’ is therefore central to an adequate 
interpretation of the ECN but it is also important in two other respects.  It helps to   9
interpret the present and future impact of competition policy on the shape of the 
European political economy; and it is the key variable in determining whether the 
ECN is sui generis or whether this model could be generalised to other policy areas. 
We need therefore to devote some attention to unpacking the elements of the common 
competition culture. 
  A focus on the common competition culture stresses the ideational elements of 
this policy area and is far from original.  There has been a consistent resort to the 
concept of the ‘epistemic community’ in analysis of competition law convergence 
across Europe (Wilks, 2004). The most effective deployment of this approach, 
drawing directly upon Haas, has been by van Waarden and Drahos (2002). They put 
the greatest emphasis on law as a unifying source of expertise and essentially 
advanced a concept of a European legal epistemic community as the mobilising force 
behind convergence. As Slaughter (2004, p.42) points out, Haas’s early work needs to 
be supplemented with an organisational account of how the influence of an epistemic 
community is brought to bear. In response to this challenge we can deploy the ideas of 
Schmidt and Radaelli turning to the concept of a ‘discursive institutionalism’ in which 
discourse ‘represents both the policy ideas that speak to the soundness and 
appropriateness of policy programmes and the interactive processes of policy 
formulation and communication that serve to generate and disseminate those policy 
ideas’ (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004, p.193). The following paragraphs hence attempt 
to unpack the concept of the common competition culture exploring how the legal 
epistemic community exerts influence through DG Comp and the ECN and going on 
to set the scene for a possible adaptation of the epistemic community as a legal 
discourse is supplemented, and possibly transformed, by economic expertise and an 
economic discourse. 
The common competition culture can be unpacked into a legal discourse, a 
market discourse and a depoliticised discourse. We start with the legal discourse 
which articulates a legal culture.  The legal constituents of the European competition 
regime are relatively familiar.  They originate from the crucial early decisions to 
include competition rules in the ECSC and Rome Treaties, the direct application of 
the competition rules by the Commission, the remorselessly supportive and 
teleological judgements by the ECJ, the creation of expansive legal doctrine and its 
embodiment in precedent and case law.  By the time that the later accession countries 
came to join the Union they were required to sign up to a competition acquis that was   10
elaborate, relatively comprehensive and provided a hegemonic package of public law. 
EU competition policy developed as essentially a legal system influenced by German 
thinking and the ordoliberal tradition and hence giving priority to legal principles as a 
framework within which the European economy should develop.  German cartel 
enforcement is dominated by lawyers and so, until very recently, was DG Comp. 
They formed part of a larger legal network or epistemic community across Europe 
and across the Atlantic embracing legal scholars, the big law firms, the courts and the 
Commission itself. The whole process and language of competition law enforcement 
is infused with legal norms regarding due process, the rights of the parties, the 
standing of evidence, the weight of precedent, the role of hearings, questions of 
proportionality and the need to sustain those norms in the event of challenge through 
appeal to the ECJ or the CFI. Increasingly scholars are reflecting on the self-interest 
of the legal profession in sustaining and expanding the competition regime and the 
law firms play a part not only in developing doctrine and animating the regime but in 
enforcing policy through advice to business firms on compliance. They are valued and 
important players in the pan-European implementation of policy but they are also 
substantial beneficiaries (Wigger, 2007a).  The ECN floats in this sea of legal 
discourse which is manifest in the multitude of conferences, workshops, training 
events, legal journals, cases and commentaries which reflect the status of competition 
law as a major and lucrative specialism of most international law firms. It provides a 
comprehensive set of typical norms – tacit but specific – which will be shared by all 
participants in the Network and which are a necessity for understanding and operating 
within the ECN. 
  The second component of the common competition culture is a market 
discourse.  Competition policy takes its meaning, and its complexity, from its role in 
defending the operation of the market. Competition is the process of rivalry that 
provides the dynamic of market economies but market structures and competitive 
dynamics can produce wildly variant outcomes and the hundred year history of 
antitrust and competition policy has produced only a small number of unambiguous or 
per se rules. European competition policy is above all else about promoting and 
defending the free market but that is a mission fraught with ambiguity and susceptible 
to widely varying definitions. In a stimulating recent study (which he calls ‘strategic 
constructivist’) Jabko has argued that the Commission has used ‘the market’ as a 
‘strategic repertoire of ideas’ leading to a ‘quiet revolution’ of dramatically deepened   11
European unity and a transformation in  European economic governance (Jabko, 
2006, pp.39,5,2). But, he argues, the Commission employed multiple meanings of the 
market in a discourse that was tailored to the circumstances of particular negotiations 
and left a deep ambiguity about what sort of market Europe should embrace.  This 
account meshes nicely with the evolution of the ECN which is a manifestation of a 
political strategy pursued by the Commission but which appears to conceal any 
particular market biases behind a technical assessment based on precedent and formal 
legal tests.  
  Historically European competition policy had a distinctive and dominant 
mission in giving priority to market integration. The OECD asserts that ‘the market 
integration goal (is) largely accomplished’ (OECD, 2005, pp.9,12) but it remains an 
important context, especially for the new accession states. Defining the market 
mission of competition policy post-market integration poses a debate about goals, and 
especially about how competition policy can help or hinder the economic 
competitiveness of European industry and the achievement of the Lisbon objectives. It 
also encounters a complex assessment of economic doctrines which offer conflicting 
interpretations of how particular competitive conditions will influence efficiency, 
economic welfare, consumer welfare and productivity. These complexities have yet to 
have a conclusive impact on the design or enforcement of European policy and the 
ECN need only to agree on the virtues of competition within the market which is 
conventionally assessed through a pragmatic neo-classical model of competition 
which does not pursue perfect competition but rather ‘workable competition’. 
Economic approaches have become more sophisticated and stress economic 
efficiency assessed through the tools of welfare economics (Motta, 2004, p.30) which 
opens up the possibility that participants in the ECN will need to accept a greater 
degree of microeconomic sophistication.  
  The third element in the assessment of the common competition culture is a 
discourse of depoliticisation.  The independence enjoyed by DG Comp is mirrored in 
the independence of the majority of NCAs. This emphasis helps to justify the closed 
and inter-governmental nature of the ECN but it also arguably contributes to a sense 
that competition policy should not be influenced or ‘tainted’ by extraneous political or 
policy considerations.  There are some clear possibilities for conflict between 
competition policy outcomes and the goals of other policy areas.  Policies in areas 
such as the environment, regional development, research and development, or energy   12
self-sufficiency have all in recent years fallen foul of competition enforcement.  There 
is a tendency to see competition as enjoying a higher priority in the hierarchy of 
policies so that it is almost a ‘meta-policy’. An equivalent perspective is to suggest 
that competition has a ‘constitutional’ status.  The early community was explicitly an 
economic rather than a political construct and defined by reference to economic 
aspirations. The ordoliberal origins of German and then European policy were quite 
explicit in looking to an economic constitution and an objective legal framework 
which would control both private and public economic power.  This traditional 
perspective on economic policy has undergone something of a renaissance in the 
aftermath of the single market programme. In the formulation of the OECD: 
with encouragement from the judiciary, competition law framed an economic 
  constitution. …. The Court’s encouragement of the Commission in setting the 
  terms of market integration gave the Treaty rules about competition a quasi-
  constitutional status  (OECD, 2005, p.11; see also Stone-Sweet, 2004, 
 pp.19,241).   
This component of the discourse of the ECN stresses the importance, or perhaps self-
importance, of the agencies concerned and the possibility that the ECN is insular and 
resistant to outside influence.  
  In rounding off this discussion of the ECN it is possible to present a stark 
contrast with the Coen and Thatcher analysis of other ERNs. They see the networks as 
relatively weak and with limited ability to initiate policy.  The ECN is consistent with 
their analysis in that it is also dominated by the principal (the Commission) but it 
differs from their cases in that the Commission can ‘impose’ decisions and the 
network actors have considerable delegated power. In this area it is therefore possible 
to identify an effective form of ‘sectoral governance’. Indeed, the contrasting concern 
about the ECN is that it might be too strong. In 2005 I speculated that modernization 
‘might lead to a European future where competition law became a dominant mode of 
regulating the greater European economy …… there may be dangers in a policy that 
is too successful’ (Wilks, 2005a, p.447).  The more recent evolution of the ECN 
within the wider development of European competition policy would appear to 
reinforce that diagnosis. Curiously a not dissimilar but more general note of warning 
has been offered by Williams (2005, p.96) in his discussion of agency ‘monomania’. 
He observes that ‘the problem of some independent agencies, those that serve the 
single market and the ECB above all, is that they are all too effective. Faithfully   13
filling a specified set of responsibilities, unchecked by institutions able to take a wider 
view’. We can come back to the dangers of hyper-competence after a brief discussion 
of the transition of European policy 
 
European competition policy in transition. 
The creation of the ECN as part of the Modernisation package represents one 
dimension of the contemporary transition of EU competition policy but there are 
several other dimensions. Modernisation has acted as the midwife of change by 
freeing up the resources and energy of DG Comp allowing it to take policy initiatives 
and to move on to further programmes of doctrinal reform. Before Modernisation and 
the ECN, DG Comp was obliged to deal with a substantial workload of notifications, 
complaints, case handling and appeals. One explicit justification for Modernisation 
was to redirect those resources towards more proactive work attacking hard core 
cartels. Some observers had felt this to be a disingenuous argument and maintained 
that the notifications workload was not excessively demanding but this argument also 
reemphasised one puzzling feature of the operation of DG Comp, namely its 
persistent understaffing, seen in the relatively small number of senior case officers. 
This lack of resources has been blamed for procedural inadequacies and substantive 
errors (Morgan and McGuire, 2002, p.44). In comparison with other regimes (with 
under half the number employed in the US) it is indeed remarkable that the 
Commission employs so few officials to deal with the complexities of competition 
enforcement across a multi-national market of 380 million consumers but that is an 
arcane aspect of Commission internal politics which remains unexplained. 
  DG Comp reorganised itself following Modernisation and moved into a period 
of transition which we can analyse under three aspects.  First, there have been a series 
of policy initiatives; second, the philosophy and expert base of competition 
administration is shifting from law to economics; and third, the convergence of 
European and US competition law and policy appears to be increasing. 
  DG Comp has taken major policy initiatives in respect of cartel control, state 
aid control, competition in utility markets (especially in energy), and in assessing 
markets as well as companies through a new methodology of sectoral market studies. 
It has also been a major participant in the post-Lisbon debate about the stalled 
attempts to increase the competitiveness of European industry. All of these areas are 
interesting, especially the way in which the ECN has allowed more active   14
investigation and prosecution of cartels (McGowan, 2005). The success of the cartel 
programme is impressive with high profile prosecutions, the revelation of deliberate 
and shocking cases of market abuse, the imposition of huge fines and the sense of 
evangelism in the crusade against cartels which Mario Monti once described as a 
‘cancer’ in the European economic body. Here the deployment of leniency 
programmes on the US model has proved astonishingly successful and seems to have 
given administrative teeth to the economist’s more abstract assertions that cartels are 
inherently unstable and prone to cheating. 
  The Lisbon debate is important for the development of policy because it 
encourages a reappraisal of competition policy away from its political origins and 
towards substantive micro-economic policy.  Competition policy has always had a 
tacit role in the protection of economic democracy through the guarantee of a 
tolerable degree of equity in the market and the elimination of gross abuse. To some 
extent this role has been symbolic and there are plenty of cynical commentaries on the 
ineffectual enforcement of the Sherman and Clayton Acts which could have been 
paralleled in Europe prior to the early 1990s. The reconceptualisation of competition 
policy as an economic policy instrument owes much to the Harvard School work of 
Michael Porter and his research on the national economic origins of competitive 
advantage. He has, of course, argued influentially that it is companies, not nations, 
that compete and that competitive success is related to the intensity of competition in 
the home market.  The British Treasury has been very influenced by this argument 
(Wilks, 2006, OFT, 2007) and it is also having an impact on the European debate.  
This link has been made explicit in a range of Commission papers. To take one 
example, a 2004 policy statement asserts that ‘effective competition between firms in 
the enlarged internal market must be seen as one of the key elements of a successful 
strategy to build up a competitive Europe and reinvigorate the Lisbon Strategy’ (CEC, 
2002, p.5). This refrain has been taken up at the political level with the strong support 
of Neelie Kroes as the Competition Commissioner. In a recent speech she articulated 
the economist’s reconceptualisation of competition policy arguing that ‘I have no 
qualms in saying that competition policy forms – or should form – a central plank in 
any industrial policy’. She also articulated the crucial transmission mechanism 
between competition and competitiveness arguing that ‘there is considerable 
empirical evidence of a clear and strong link between competition and productivity 
growth – and hence of an important link between competition and competitiveness’   15
(Kroes, 2006). This suggestion that competition policy is the new industrial policy has 
profound implications for the industrial organisation of national capitalist systems and 
also for the day-to-day implementation of policy. When assessing individual cases 
officials sometimes (but not always) assess efficiency aspects; they sometimes (but 
not always) assess consumer detriment; and they sometimes (but rather rarely) assess 
cases within a global market. If competition rules were to be applied with an eye to 
the competitiveness of European industry in the global market would officials need to 
consider productivity as part of their case assessment? This would constitute a 
fundamental shift in competition assessment and opens up fascinating but remarkably 
complex questions about the criteria to be used to settle case decisions. This bears on 
the increased use of economics in making decisions and underlines the dangers of 
reconceptualising competition policy as industrial policy, namely that it then ceases to 
control large businesses corporations. In a stimulating attack on the allegedly anti-
competitive implications of current European competition doctrine Vallindas, for 
instance, calls for a Chicago-School type efficiency defence in European cases and  
argues that the Union ‘will have to choose between a neutral competition policy on 
the one hand, which acknowledges respect for legal rules as its only parameters, and a 
strategic competition policy on the other, the implementation of which would take the 
protection of EU interests into consideration’ (Vallindas, 2006, pp.665,660). Some 
Americans, of course, would argue that EU merger enforcement is already quite 
partisan enough (Fox, 2003). 
  This discussion of competition policy as industrial policy has already 
introduced the question of an increased emphasis upon economics in EU competition 
policy and it raises the second aspect of transition which is the shift from law to 
economics. The OECD comments on an increased reliance on economic reasoning 
which it characterises as the ‘economic reconstruction’ of DG Comp and which it 
dates from 1997 (OECD, 2005, p.12). But the widely noted deficit in DG Comp 
economists and economic reasoning was not decisively addressed until the DG 
encountered major embarrassing shortcomings in respect of the hugely controversial 
blocking of the GE/Honeywell merger in 2001 and the loss at appeal of Airtours and 
two other merger cases in 2002. In each case the DG was coruscatingly criticised for 
the gross inadequacy of its economic analysis (Morgan and McGuire, 2004, p.53). 
The response was to appoint for the first time a Chief Economist (Lars-Hendrick 
Roller and then Damien Neven), to create an economics unit, an economic advisory   16
council and to recruit more economists. Mario Monti, the then Commissioner, was 
pivotal in this turn to economics which has been consolidated by the appointment of 
Neelie Kroes, also originally an economist by training. 
  The introduction of economists and economic analysis into organisations has 
been the subject of extensive organisational analysis. In the case of antitrust Marc 
Eisner (1991) has undertaken a fascinating study of the introduction of economists 
into the DoJ during the Reagan period.  He analyses not only the introduction of 
economic doctrine, most obviously Chicago doctrine, but examines the effects of 
incorporating economists as direct case handlers rather than expert advisers.  The 
effect, he establishes, was to reinforce the ‘disarmament’ of antitrust during the 
1980s. It would be intriguing to draw US/EU parallels and speculate on the impact of 
intensified economic analysis in Europe.  Unfortunately we have no equivalent in 
European literature of the magisterial examination by Kovacic (2004) of the norms of 
US antitrust enforcement. He warns against simplistic interpretations of the swings in 
US enforcement (what he calls the ‘pendulum narrative’) and argues for a pattern of 
cumulative intensification. In Europe a comprehensive study of the impact of 
economic doctrine on antitrust has yet to be written but one or two scholars have 
begun to advance hypotheses.  Angela Wigger has produced an important and 
controversial thesis in which she argues that DG Comp has, since the early 1990s, had 
a strong neoliberal bias which has displaced the ‘ordoliberal’ legacy from its German 
origins (Wigger, 2007b)). She argues that Modernisation accentuated the ‘trend 
towards the use of ever more sophisticated neoclassical economic principles and 
econometric evidence in the assessment of anticompetitive conduct’ and she goes on 
to argue that: 
  Apart from the numerical transformation of competition officers with a 
  background in economics, a range of indicators lay bare that the kind of 
  competition economics that made its entry is grounded in microeconomics, 
 analytically  premised  on  methodological  individualism, and home-based in the 
  neoliberal free market ideology. The new creed (sic) of economists maintains 
  strong transatlantic links indicating that the substance of economic theories 
  that has become prevailing in EU enforcement practice is likely to be 
  streamlined with that dominant in the US  (Wigger, 2007a), pp.106,107-108). 
She offers a radical theory of the coalition of forces that support this turn to 
microeconomics which include major corporations in ‘corporate Europe’, the   17
epistemic community of lawyers and professional service companies, and also, 
intriguingly, shareholders interested in gaining additional control over their 
companies through Anglo-Saxon style corporate governance (Wigger, 2007a), 116-
117).  She goes on to extend this analysis into two radical and intriguing implications.  
  These implications introduce our third theme for this section, the convergence 
of US and EU competition law and economics. Of course it is a commonplace that the 
US system provided the benchmark for the European development of antitrust and US 
principles were imported directly into the EEC (Amato, 1997; Gerber, 1998; Djelic, 
1998). But developments from the early 1960s saw a material divergence of US and 
EU practice as a result partly of the massive differences between the US approach 
through private law and the EU approach through administrative application of public 
law. Competition enforcement also naturally adapted to the capitalist economic 
models of the two jurisdictions reflecting the neoliberal trajectory of US policy and 
the organised capitalism of continental Europe. An interpretation of renewed 
convergence between the US and the EU would therefore raise the prospect of a 
convergence of capitalist models between the EU and the US but, equally interesting, 
within Europe itself, and this is exactly what Wigger has also suggested. She 
emphasises the explicit approval of greater US/EU convergence expressed by Mario 
Monti and a variety of US commentators and symbolised especially in the borrowing 
of US merger principles including the adaptation of the EU merger test from a 
dominance test to include a test of substantial lessening of competition (the SLC test, 
also used in the UK). She further stresses one under-emphasised aspect of the ECN 
and the Modernisation reforms, namely the encouragement of private actions to 
enforce the competition rules and to seek damages where they are transgressed. The 
abolition of the notification system means that private businesses have now to decide 
for themselves if their agreements and competitive practices conform to EU law. Final 
determinations, without the involvement of competition agencies, can only be decided 
by court cases (Wigger, 2004, p.5) and this opens up the possibility for challenge 
from private parties, whether they are competitors, consumers, suppliers and so on.  
There is no doubt that DG Comp is encouraging private actions and this in turn 
implies less intervention by the public authorities.  In a perceptive analysis of the 
effects of growing private enforcement Wigger (2007a), p.109) points out that 
‘whereas before a public authority could balance the decision making in antitrust 
matters according to broader political macroeconomic goals, individual private   18
claimants by definition are more likely to be driven by self-interest’. The effect, she 
argues, is to take ‘a major step of convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon antitrust 
model’ (Wigger, 2007a), p.104). The prospect, in other words, is the reproduction of a 
US regime which is dominated by private antitrust actions. 
  Wigger’s second implication of the neoliberal, microeconomic turn in EU 
competition doctrine is to suggest that it poses a challenge to ‘Rhenish’ capitalism. 
This is an argument of huge importance for the development of economic governance 
within Europe and it is extraordinary that the interplay between varieties of capitalism 
and the capitalist model enshrined in European competition policy has been so little 
researched. There are several effective studies of the different models of capitalism 
prevailing within Europe which originate with Albert’s distinction between Rhenish 
and Anglo-Saxon capitalism in a dichotomy that is more thoroughly presented by Hall 
and Soskice (2001) as a contrast between the German-style Coordinated Market 
Economy and the UK-style Liberal Market Economy. Schmidt (2002, 107) offers a 
more elaborate categorisation of  three ‘market, managed and state’ capitalist variants 
and, although a number of other typologies exist, all of them locate capitalist models 
in relation to specific nation-states and none of them propose a single European 
capitalist model (Crouch, 2005). The proposition, therefore, that DG Comp will be 
enforcing competition policy by reference to an Anglo-Saxon concept of competitive 
behaviour within the European economy, poses the possibility that it will seek to 
dismantle the managed economy and the state economy models which predominate in 
continental Europe. Competition policy already attacks state aid, will it also militate 
against German cross shareholding and bank shareholding, against the dislike of 
hostile takeovers, against policies to support the Mittelstand, and against relational 
contracting? This paints a more sinister picture of the common enforcement policy 
exerted through the ECN and raises again the prospects of conflict and disagreement 
within the Network. 
  
Conclusions 
A provisional assessment of the ECN indicates that it is operating coherently and 
effectively to enforce competition rules across the EU. This assessment is subject to 
two caveats. First, that the ECN is only three years old and may be enjoying a 
honeymoon period which has suppressed tensions.  Second, that the Network relates 
to a rather specific activity, the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 (TEU), and does   19
not therefore link all agency activity.  Control of mergers in particular is not covered 
although there is some spillover effect into other aspects of the competition regime. 
  There is an important question as to whether the ECN experience can be 
generalised to other policy areas.  The initial assessment would be that the ECN is 
atypical and probably does not offer an easily generaliseable model for other ERNs. 
Specifically, it is concerned with the enforcement of clear legal provisions contained 
in the Treaty.  It is managed by the Commission and has been able to reproduce the 
exceptional supranational authority previously enjoyed by DG Comp. Indeed, this 
paper argues that it offers an exceptionally powerful model of policy enforcement 
which reflects the politics of competition policy and the normative coherence of the 
policy community. Thus the ECN is characterised by a level of political and 
normative solidarity that could be regarded as excessively strong. That strength could 
become problematic if, as suggested by some scholars, DG Comp has developed a 
particular policy stance in the form of a neoliberal interpretation of competition policy 
which, whilst shared by competition agencies, is resisted by ‘old fashioned’ industrial 
policy  protagonists and by defenders of the managed and state models of national 
capitalism within Europe.  
  At present, it is argued, DG Comp and EU competition policy is in a period of 
transition marked by a series of policy initiatives and by a turn to economic analysis. 
Partly because its policy stance is still emerging, and partly because the application of 
the competition rules are still poorly understood outside the specialist competition 
community, there is limited resistance to the emergent neoliberal and ‘Americanised’ 
policy stance. But the shape and intensity of potential resistance is flagged by the 
French rejection of the European Constitution. This was widely interpreted as a 
rejection of the neoliberal biases felt to be embodied in the Treaty provisions and 
aims.  The neoliberal dimension was widely debated in the run up to the referendum. 
Part III of the Constitution ‘was constructed by the No campaign as the handmaiden 
of an ultraliberal Europe, which was more in line with an ‘Anglo-Saxon model’ 
(Hainsworth, 2006, p.104). The French rejection also partially inspired Jabko’s study 
of the Commission’s exploitation of market ideas in the pursuit of deeper unity and he 
concludes, rather soberly, with the question ‘was it a mistake to pursue an 
integrationist strategy that relied on the market’s compelling appeal? …. Once the 
promoters of Europe jumped on the bandwagon of market reforms they were caught 
in a process that went beyond the control of any single actor’ (Jabko, 2006, p.185). He   20
warns of a possible backlash against the market discourse and reverses the title of his 
book to ponder whether we have been seeing ‘Playing Unity: A Political Strategy for 
the Marketisation of Europe’ (Jabko, 2006, p.186). This takes us a long way from the 
more mundane administrative features of the ECN but it does underline one crucial 
feature of depoliticised regulatory agencies which applies doubly to a transnational 
regulatory network, that is the problem of accountability. 
  The debate on accountability has accompanied the whole debate about 
European regulation and the position of the regulatory agencies. DG Comp has 
always been seen as lacking in political accountability and with a deficit in process 
accountability which was compensated for only by the stringency of legal control and 
appeal to the European courts. If the Modernisation package and the operation of the 
ECN has allowed the Commission to extend the influence of competition policy 
across Europe, and has to some extent neutered national laws and harnessed national 
agencies, then arguably this accountability deficit has been accentuated. The 
seriousness of an accountability deficit depends on the analysis of the competition 
model that the Commission is adopting, and the analysis of in whose interests that 
model operates. If Wigger is right, and that model is not only neoliberal, but is 
embedding an Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism across Europe, then it will become 
necessary to assess the competition rules as part not of a neutral European economic 
constitution, but as a source of structural bias which should be far more critically 
examined before Europe accepts a quasi-constitutional settlement that embodies a 
particular model of economic governance. 
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Table 1:  The Global Elite of Competition Agencies   
        Cartel  GCR 
        fines  Staff Enforce 
        E   m n .   R a n k  
          
EU  DG  Comp      683  382 4.5 
          
US  Department of Justice    513  566 4.5 
          
US  Federal Trade Commission    0  281 4.5 
          
UK Competition  Commission    0  82 4.5 
          
UK  Office of Fair Trading      1  242 4 
          
Australia  Competition and Consumer Comm.  18  273 4 
          
France Competition  Council      663  53 4 
          
Germany Cartel  Office      164  154 4 
          
          
Notes:          
  information relates to 2005       
  GCR ranking based on assessment of competence in enforcement and 
    in particular on results; development; cooperation; independence 
  
and resources. Rankings are 
annual.  
  GCR user ranking on a substantial survey of agency employees and  
    competition practitioners. It measures 'how they felt about 
    the agencies they had regular dealings with'.   
  Ranks are based on a star rating of 1 to 5; 5 being outstanding.   
          
Source: 
Global Competition Review 9(7) July 
2006    
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Table 2  European Competition Agencies       
             
Member State    Enforce    User  Staff budget cartel 
       rank 2005
rank 
2005  
fines E 
mn
           
EU DG  Comp      4.5  3.75  382 90 683
UK Comp  Comm.    4.5  4  82 30 0
UK  Office of Fair Trading    4  3.75  242  50 1
France Comp  Council    4  3.25  53  9 663
France DGCCRF      3.5  3.25  400  26
Germany BKA     4  4  154  17 164
Denmark Danish  Comp.  Authority  3.75  3.25  63  6
Finland  Finnish Comp. Authority  3.75  2.75  50  5
Ireland  The Comp. Authority    3.75  4  46  5
Italy AGCM      3.75  3.25  102  27 12
Netherlands Comp. Authority    3.75  3.25  174  10 141
Spain Comp.  Service    3.5  3  52  3 10
Spain Comp  Tribunal    2.75  3  44  5
Sweden  Swedish Comp. Authority  3.5  2.75  85  9 12
Portugal  Portuguese Comp. Authority  3.25  3.25  59  7 29
Austria  Federal Comp. Authority  3  3  18  1
Belgium Comp.  Council    2.75  2.5  19  0
Belgium Comp.  Service    1.25  2.5  37 
Poland  Office of Comp. & Cons Protect.  2.75  2  134  7 1
Greece Hellenic  Comp.  Commission  2.5  1.75  52  12 20
Not ranked by GCR           
Cyprus  Comm. For Protection of Competition     
Czech Republic  Office for the Protection of Comp.    112 
Estonia Estonian  Competition  Board      39 
Hungary  Hungarian Competition Authority     119 
Latvia Competition  Council        53 
Lithuania Competition  Council        61 
Luxembourg, Comp Council & Comp Inspection    3 
Malta  Commission for Fair Trading      1 
Romania Romanian  Competition  Council      283 
Slovak Republic, Antimonopoly Office      70 
Slovenia  Competition Protection Office      20 
Bulgaria  Comm. Protection of Comp          99 
           
Notes:            
  all information relates to 2005         
  DG Comp includes regulation of state aid - 108 staff     
  several agencies also deal with consumer protection     
  rankings attributed by GCR and GCR user survey (see Table 1)   
Sources:           
  'Rating Enforcement', Global Competition Review, 9(7), July 2006 
  The 2006 Handbook of Competition Enforcement Agencies, Global Competition Review, 
  Special Report, December 2006       
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Table 3  European Competition Agencies: ECN Activity     
              
Member State     No.  cases 
No. 
cases 
No. 
cases  
         opened % total decided  
            
EU DG  Comp        133 20 
UK  Comp Comm.  (not an ECN member)   
UK  Office of Fair Trading      40  6  8
France Comp  Council         
France  DGCCRF        102 16 32
Germany  BKA        70 11 12
Denmark Danish  Comp.  Authority    36  6  16
Finland  Finnish Comp. Authority    10  2  5
Ireland  The Comp. Authority      8  1  0
Italy AGCM        21  3  12
Netherlands Comp. Authority      45  7  25
Spain  Comp.  Service      23 4 8
Spain  Comp Tribunal  (not an ECN member)   
Sweden  Swedish Comp. Authority    20  3  10
Portugal  Portuguese Comp. Authority    16  2  5
Austria  Federal Comp. Authority    14  2  2
Belgium Comp.  Council         
Belgium  Comp.  Service      23 4 2
Poland  Office of Comp. & Cons Protect.    12  2  4
Greece  Hellenic  Comp.  Commission    8 1 7
Not ranked by GCR           
Cyprus  Comm. For Protection of Competition  0  0 
Czech Republic  Office for the Protection of Comp.  8  1  5
Estonia  Estonian  Competition  Board    5 1 1
Hungary  Hungarian Competition Authority    42  6  7
Latvia  Competition  Council      4 1 1
Lithuania  Competition  Council      2 0 2
Luxembourg, Comp Council & Comp Inspection  1  0  0
Malta  Commission for Fair Trading    1  0  0
Romania Romanian  Competition  Council    n/a   
Slovak Republic, Antimonopoly Office    4  1  3
Slovenia  Competition Protection Office    2  0  1
Bulgaria  Comm. Protection of Comp.        n/a   
         650  100 
Notes:            
  data covers 2004, 2005 and the period Jan to Nov 2006   
  cases relate to possible infringements of Arts 81, 82 or both   
            
            
Sources:          
  DG Comp website, accessed 18/4/07       
           
 